Injunctive Relief and the Madsen Test by Staver, Mathew D.
Liberty University
DigitalCommons@Liberty
University
Faculty Publications and Presentations Liberty University School of Law
1994
Injunctive Relief and the Madsen Test
Mathew D. Staver
Liberty University, mstaver@liberty.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lusol_fac_pubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at DigitalCommons@Liberty University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Liberty University. For more
information, please contact scholarlycommunication@liberty.edu.
Recommended Citation
Staver, Mathew D., "Injunctive Relief and the Madsen Test" (1994). Faculty Publications and Presentations. Paper 21.
http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lusol_fac_pubs/21
HeinOnline -- 14 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 465 1994-1995
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND THE MADSEN TEST 
MATHEW D. STAVER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Though injunctive relief lies at the heart of judicial power, 
the United States Supreme Court surprisingly has decided very few 
speech restricting injunction cases outside the ambit of the National 
Labor Relations Act.! Until the Supreme Court's decision in Madsen 
v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,2 cases involving injunctive relief 
have used a mixed analysis--combining standards applicable to ordi-
nances3 and standards applicable to injunctions without any critical 
distinction.4 In Madsen, the Supreme Court finally made a distinction 
* Mathew D. Staver is the founder of the law finn Staver and Associates 
located in Orlando, Florida. He is also President of Liberty Counsel, a civil 
liberties education and legal defense organization. His practice is concentrated in 
First Amendment free speech and religious liberty litigation. He was lead counsel 
for the pro-life demonstrators in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. 
Ct. 2516 (1994) and Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993), upon 
which this Article is based. 
1. The few cases involving injunctions seeking to restrict speech outside 
application of federal labor picketing laws include: CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. 
Ct. 912 (1994) (Blackmun, J., in chambers) (setting aside state court preliminary 
injunction against a scheduled broadcast); Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 
2766 (1993); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Vance v. 
Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980); Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 
709 (1979) (Blackmun, J., in chambers) (expediting appeal involving an injunction 
restraining publication); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); 
National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Orga-
nization for A Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); New York Times 
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of 
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 
307 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Hughes v. Superior Court of Cal., 
339 U.S. 460 (1950); Building Servo Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 
532 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Cafete-
ria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery & Pastry Drivers 
& Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697 (1931); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Gompers v. United 
States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 
418 (1911). 
2. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). 
3. In this Article, references to ordinances include statutes and regulations. 
4. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 n.4 (noting that the Court's opinion in 
465 
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between injunctions and ordinances, and developed a new test appli~ 
cable to content-neutral injunctions. 
The Madsen test applies only to content-neutral injunctions 
which are neither prior restraints nor content-based restrictions. That 
test is summarized as follows: injunctive relief affecting speech is 
permissible only upon a showing that (1) "the defendant has violated, 
or imminently will violate, some provision of statutory or common 
law";s (2) there is' a "cognizable danger of recurrent violation";6 (3) 
a nonspeech restrictive injunction preventing the repeated illegal con-
duct has proven ineffective to protect the significant government 
interests because the defendant has repeatedly violated the injunc-
tion;' and (4) a subsequent speech restrictive injunction may not 
burden more speech than necessary to serve a significant government 
interest 8 The first two prongs of this test are applicable to any in-
junction since injunctive relief is an equitable remedy.9 Thus, prongs 
one and two must be met before the entry of any injunction, whether 
the injunction restricts speech or conduct. After prongs one and two 
are met, a court may restore law and order by a nonspeech restric-
tive injunction. If that injunction proves to be ineffective, a subse-
quent speech restrictive injunction may be issued, but that injunction 
may not burden more speech than necessary to serve a significant 
government interest. 
II. THE HIsTORY OF MADSEN 
In order to apply the Madsen decision, it is imperative to 
understand its historical background. This background involved two 
separate injunctions, the first a nonspeech restrictive permanent in-
junction, and the second a speech restrictive amended permanent 
injunction. 
A. The First Injunction 
On September 30, 1992, a Florida state trial court permanent-
ly enjoined certain pro-life protesterslO from trespassing on, sitting 
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) cited Carroll v. President & Comm'rs 
of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), a case involving an injunction, and 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), a case involving a statute 
and regulations). 
5. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.3. 
6. Id. (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 
(1953». 
7. Id. at 2527. 
8. Id. at 2525-26. 
9. Id. at 2524 n.3. 
10. The named protesters included Operation Rescue, Operation Rescue 
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in, blocking, impeding, or obstructing ingress into or egress from any 
abortion clinic in Brevard and Seminole counties, Florida, and further 
restrained them from physically abusing persons entering, leaving, or 
using any services of the facilities. ll Following the shooting of Dr. 
David Gunn outside a Pensacola, Florida abortion clinic, one of the 
clinicsl2 involved in the fIrst injunction, Aware Woman Center for 
Choice, Inc. (Aware), located in Melbourne, Florida, requested that 
the 1992 injunction be amended to further restrict pro-life activi-
ties.13 
America. Operation Goliath, Bruce Cadle, Pat Mahoney, Randall Terry, and the 
three petitioners who were before the Supreme Court: Judy Madsen, Ed Martin, 
and Shirley Hobbs. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521 n.1. Interestingly, there was no 
such organization known as Operation Rescue America or Operation Goliath. 
Moreover, there is no corporate entity presently known as Operation Rescue. The 
real organization involved in the protests was Operation Rescue National, but that 
entity was never named as a defendant. 
11. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521; see also Brief for Petitioners at 3, Madsen 
v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (No. 93-880). 
12. The clinics which sought the first injunction were Women's Health Cen-
ter, Inc., Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc., EPOC Clinic, Inc., and Central 
Florida Women's Health Organization, Inc. Petitioner's Request for Certiorari at 
3-5, Madsen (No. 93-880). 
13. Though Aware was the only clinic involved in requesting the amended 
permanent injunction, the trial court did not amend the pleadings. Despite the fact 
that Aware was the only clinic at issue in the second injunction, the clinics in 
the first injunction remained named parties. The requested amendment coincided 
with increased pro-life activity by a group known as Operation Rescue National. 
In addition to requesting that the injunction be amended, Aware also requested 
that the defendants in the previous injunction be held in contempt for violating 
that court order. Of the three petitioners who eventually went to the United 
States Supreme Court in the Madsen case, only one testified because no allega-
tions of contempt were brought against the other two-Judy Madsen and Shirley 
Hobbs. Ed Martin was the only petitioner before the Supreme Court who testified 
in the state trial court proceedings to amend the permanent injunction. He testi-
fied that he had not been at the Aware clinic in two to three years. The only 
evidence introduced against him was that on one occasion he was walking back 
and forth across the clinic driveway entrance, and when""a doctor drove up, the 
doctor honked the hom, and he moved out of the way. See Petitioners' Reply 
Brief at 10-11, Madsen (No. 93-880). The lead petitioner in the Madsen case, 
Judy Madsen, had never been to the Aware clinic. During the 1993 hearing to 
amend the injunction, attorneys for Aware stated: "I have already said that Judy 
Madsen is not a target of these contempt proceedings." Id. at 9. The entire tran-
script of the 1993 proceedings was reproduced in a Joint Appendix before the 
Supreme Court, along with the following interchange between the state trial court 
judge and counsel for Judy Madsen: 
[COUNSEL] Weiss: With respect to, I believe there has been a stipulation 
that Mrs. Madsen has not violated any of the court's [permanent] injunction 
whatsoever. If I've got that cleared then -
The COURT: That's my understanding. 
[d. at 9. 
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B. The Second Injunction 
On April 8, 1993, the Florida state trial court entered the 
second injunction, known as the amended permanent injunction. That 
injunction incorporated the language of the prior 1992 injunction14 
but added a thirty-six. foot speech-free zone around the clinic;ls a 
restriction on noises and images which could be seen or heard from 
within the clinic;16 a 300 foot no-approach or consent zone around 
the clinic;!7 a 300 foot anti-picketing zone around the residential 
homes of those associated with the clinic;18 and other restrictions 
n'ot challenged before the United States Supreme Court.19 
In addition to restricting the named defendants, the injunction 
was expanded to include persons acting in concert or in participation 
with them.20 Though no named defendant was ever found in con-
14. The language incorporated from the 1992 injunction prohibiting trespass-
ing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding, or obstructing ingress into or egress from 
the clinics, and physical abuse was not challenged. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522, 
2526 n.5. 
15. The injunction prohibited the defendants "[a]t all times on all days, 
from congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering that portion of 
the public right-of-way or private property within [36] feet of the property line 
of the Clinic .... " Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522. This speech-free zone prohibit-
ed mere penetration into the zone, two sides of which applied to record title 
owners of private property if those owners or their invitees acted in concert with 
those named in the injunction. Id. 
16. The injunction prohibited those named between "the hours of 7:30 a.m. 
through noon, on Mondays through Saturdays, during surgical procedures and re-
covery periods, from singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of 
bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other sounds or images 
observable to or within earshot of the patients inside the Clinic." Id. 
17. The injunction enjoined the protesters at "all times on all days, in an 
area within [300] feet of the Clinic, from physically approaching any person 
seeking the services of the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire to com-
municate by approaching or by inquiring. . . ." Id. 
18. The injunction prohibited those named at "all times on all days, from 
approaching, congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or using bullhorns 
or other sound amplification equipment within [300] feet of the residence of any 
of the [clinic] employees, staff, owners or agents, or blocking or attempting to 
block, barricade, or in any other manner, temporarily or otherwise, obstruct the 
entrances, exits, or driveways of the residences of any of the [clinic] employees, 
staff, owners or agents." Id. 
19. Not challenged before the Supreme Court were the sections prohibiting 
physical abuse, grabbing, intimidating, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, 
crowding, or assaulting persons entering or leaving, or working at or using the 
services of the clinic, or threatening any present or former doctor, health care 
professional, or other staff member, employee, or volunteer who assisted in pro-
viding services at the clinic. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522, 2526 n.5. 
20. Id. at 2530. The first injunction applied only to named parties. 
HeinOnline -- 14 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 469 1994-1995
1995] INJUNCTIVE REliEF AND THE MADSEN TEST 469 
tempt of the 1992 or 1993 injunctions, following the 1993 injunction 
(which included an "in concert" provision), approximately 150 people 
were arrested over several weekends for merely penetrating the thir-
ty-six foot speech-free zone.21 The injunction, as applied to those 
named, and as applied to those alleged to be "in concert," resulted in 
two separate cases which formed the basis of the Supreme Court's 
granting certiorari. 
C. The Conflict Between the Federal and State Courts 
1. The Federal Court Decision 
Once it became apparent that the amended permanent injunc-
tion was being applied by the trial court against nonparties who 
merely penetrated the thirty-six foot speech-free zone, Myrna Cheffer, 
a peaceful pro-life activist who had never been arrested, brought suit 
in federal court claiming that she, too, would be arrested for merely 
penetrating the zone. On October 20, 1993, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Cheffer v. McGregor,22 found that the state 
court's broad application of the injunction to nonparties resulted in a 
content-based restriction on free speech.23 Not only did the Cheffer 
court find the injunction content-based, it found it to be an unconsti-
tutional viewpoint restriction against nonparties.24 The court found 
that the practical effect of the injunction was to "assure that while 
21. The appendix to Justice Scalia's dissent included a colloquy between the 
same state court judge who entered the 1993 amended permanent injunction and 
the nonparty demonstrators who were arrested for merely penetrating this 36 foot 
speech-free zone. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2550-52. 
22. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993). The defendant, 
Judge Robert B. McGregor, was the state trial judge who entered the amended 
permanent injunction challenged in Madsen. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 706. 
23. Though the Cheffer decision was decided by a 2-1 majority, all three 
judges agreed that the state trial court violated Cheffer's constitutional rights. The 
two voting in the majority, including the Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit, 
found that the injunction was a content-based restriction. Instead of entering its 
own injunction blocking enforcement of the state court injunction, the two in the 
majority decided to return the case to the lower court for entry of an injunction 
following the analysis set out in the majority opinion. Following that analysis, the 
lower court would undoubtedly enter its own injunction. Id. at 712. The one 
dissenter would have entered the injunction directly from the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals without remanding it to the trial court, further stating that the 
state court exceeded its jurisdiction by attempting to apply this injunction to 
nonparties. Id. at 712-15. 
24. Id. at 711. It should be noted that the Cheffer court did not decide the 
issue of content or viewpoint restriction as it related to named parties, but only 
as the injunction had been applied to nonparties. The court found that the broad 
application of the injunction to nonparties based solely on their belief, rather than 
conduct, operated like a criminal statute. Id. at 707 n.2, 708-09. 
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'pro-life' speakers would be arrested, 'pro-choice' demonstrators 
would not."2S 
The Cheffer opinion noted that by entering its own injunction 
blocking enforcement of the state court injunction, the court would 
"promote only speech and expressive conduct, not assault, trespass, 
or destruction of property.,,26 The court characterized the dispute as 
a clash "between an actual prohibition of speech and a potential 
hindrance to the free exercise of abortion rights.'m The Cheffer case 
found that other state laws already protected the interests of the clin-
ic without infringing upon First Amendment rights and concluded by 
stating: "We protect much that offends in the name of free 
speech-we cannot refuse such protection to those who fmd abortion 
morally reprehensible.,,28 
2. The State Court Decision 
On October 28, 1993, eight days following the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision in Cheffer, the Florida Supreme Court 
rendered its decision upholding the entire injunction.29 The Florida 
Supreme Court recognized the Cheffer opinion in a footnote but of-
fered no comment.3D The Florida Supreme Court found that the in-
junction was content-neutral and, though it acknowledged that the 
injunction could be narrowed, declined "to entertain quibbling over a 
few feet.'>3i The court rejected the prior restraint argument, conclud-
ing that a prior restraint challenge was inapplicable in the absence of 
a content-based restriction.32 The court also rejected a challenge 
based on vagueness or overbreadth, stating that the sounds or images 
observable restriction was sufficiently specific to give proper notice 
as to what would be considered illegal.33 The Florida Supreme 
Court found the entire injunction constitutional.34 It also found that 
the "in concert" section created no danger that the injunction would 
be unfairly enforced.3s This classic conflict between the 
25. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 711. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 712. 
29. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 
1993). This appeal was brought by the named parties. The state proceedings in-
volving the named parties were pursued simultaneously with the federal suit 
brought by a nonparty. 
30. Id. at 676 n.lO. 
31. Id. at 673. 
32. Id. at 674. 
33. Id. at 674-75. 
34. Id. at 675. 
35. Id. Interestingly, the City of Melbourne attempted to intervene after the 
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jurisdiction's highest federal and state courts on the identical injunc-
tion set up the basis for the United States Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari.36 
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Before developing a new heightened scrutiny test governing 
certain types of injunctions, Madsen first considered whether the 
injunction was a content-based restriction. The Court then briefly 
considered whether the injunction was a prior restraint. After fmding 
that it involved neither of these forms of restriction, it developed the 
new Madsen test. 
A. Content-Neutral versus Content-Based 
The protesters argued that the injunction was content-based 
because it restricted only pro-life speech while permitting pro-choice 
speech. The Court noted that to accept this argument would result in 
finding "virtually every injunction as content or viewpoint based.'>37 
The Court further stated: 
An injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group 
(or individuals) and regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of 
that group. It does so, however, because of the group's past action in 
the context of a specific dispute between real parties.38 
Madsen further noted that "none of the restrictions imposed 
by the [trial] court were directed at the content of petitioner's mes-
sage.,,39 Not every injunction restricting speech is thereby content-
based. To determine content-neutrality, courts must consider "whether 
the government has adopted a regulation of speech 'without reference 
to the content of the regulated speech. ",40 In order to determine 
entry of the amended permanent injunction at the state trial court level in order 
to request clarification as to how the "in concert" section should be applied. The 
clinic opposed the City'S request and the state trial court denied their right to 
intervene. Petitioners' Brief at 32, Madsen (No. 93-880). 
36. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. Two petitions for certiorari were filed with 
the Supreme Court. One petition was on behalf of Operation Rescue, Randall 
Terry, Pat Mahoney, and Bruce Cadle. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 
114 S. Ct. 923 (1994). The other petition was on behalf of Judy Madsen, Ed 
Martin, and Shirley Hobbs. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 907 
(1994). The Court denied the former but granted the latter. 
37. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989» 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. 
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content-neutrality in an injunction, courts must "look to the 
government's purpose as the threshold consideration.,,41 Madsen then 
found that the state trial court imposed restrictions on the protesters 
incidental to their speech because they repeatedly violated the court's 
original order.42 
That petitioners all share the same viewpoint regarding abortion does 
not in itself demonstrate that some invidious content- or viewpoint-
based purpose motivated the issuance of the order. It suggests only 
that those in the group whose conduct violated the court's order hap-
pen to share this same opinion regarding abortions being performed at 
the clinic. In short, the fact that the injunction covered people with a 
particular viewpoint does not itself render the injunction content or 
viewpoint based.43 
The Supreme Court's rejection of the injunction as content-
based defies logic. First, the pro-life petitioners did not argue that all 
injunctions are content-based, but that the challenged injunction was 
content-based, and in fact, viewpoint-based.44 Second, the Court stat-
ed that it need not determine "whether the 'images observable' and 
'no-approach' provisions are content based.,,4s If the Court was con-
fident that the entire injunction was content-neutral, then why was 
this later caveat necessary? Third, the Court did not give sufficient 
weight to the state trial judge's own comments regarding the purpose 
of the injunction.46 Finally, the majority based part of its analysis 
on the mistaken assumption that the picketers had "repeatedly violat-
ed the court's original order.,,47 
Obviously, not every injunction is content-based. An injunc-
tion prohibiting trespass restricts not speech but conduct. However, 
an injunction restricting the display of a certain message critical of a 
business because of the message is content-based. This precise dis-
tinction occurred in Madsen. The amended permanent injunction 
Ct. 2538, 2553 (1992); Arkansas Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 
230 (1987); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984); Metromedia, Inc. 
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514-15 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 
455, 466-68 (1980). 
41. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. 
42. ld. at 2523-24. 
43. ld. at 2524 (emphasis supplied). 
44. Petitioners' Brief at 9-14, Madsen (No. 93-880). 
45. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529 n.6. 
46. See Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 
2402 (1992) (holding courts must consider authoritative constructions, including 
implementation and interpretation); see a/so City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer 
Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
47. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. This finding gave rise to a scathing dissent 
by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. ld. at 2535-37, 2545-48. 
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prohibited the display of any "images observable" which could be 
viewed from within the clinic.48 That section was not intended to 
restrict "For Sale" signs, political signs, street signs, billboards, or 
birthday party signs on someone's neighboring property. The images 
prohibited were signs such as "Baby Killer," "Child Murderer," or 
"Choose Life." This point is driven home by the fact that this re-
striction on images observable applied not only to the named parties, 
but to those acting in concert with them. To determine whether 
nonparties were acting in concert with named parties in terms of 
displaying prescribable images requires a content-based analysis of 
the message displayed. Such an analysis depends on the listener's 
reaction to the speech, and as the Court has previously held, a 
listener's "reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regula-
tion."49 
In addition to the images observable restriction, the injunction 
contained a "no-approach" provision within a 300 foot radius of the 
clinic that prohibited one with a pro-life message from "approaching 
any person seeking the services of the Clinic unless such person 
indicates a desire to communicate by approaching or inquiring."5o 
Under that restriction, the named defendants, and those acting in con-
cert with them, were prohibited from speaking unless the listener 
favorably reacted, by either approaching or indicating a desire to 
communicate.51 If the Supreme Court was confident that the entire 
injunction was content-neutral, it would not have been necessary to 
later state in a footnote52 that it need not decide whether this por-
tion of the injunction was actually content-based. Since the Court had 
previously decided the injunction was content-neutral, then why later 
raise the issue in a footnote? Moreover, the injunction contained a 
section regarding "invited contact" which the Court failed to quote. 
In relevant part, the "invited contact" provision stated: 
[A]t all times on all days, [the named pro-life parties] will have the 
right of invited contact with persons protected hereby so long as it is 
outside the Clinic buffer zone. "Invited contact" is defined as conduct 
48. Id. at 2522. 
49. Forsyth County, 110 S. Ct. at 2403; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 
u.s. 397, 411 (1989) (overturning a flag burning conviction because prosecution 
"depended on the likely communicative impact" of expressive conduct); Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (''The emotive impact of speech on its audience 
is not a 'secondary effect."'). 
50. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522. 
51. Cj. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'} Union v. IBP, Inc., 857 
F.2d 422, 432 (8th Cir. 1988) (overturning a ban on picketing and talking to or 
communicating in any manner with a person or persons against his, her, or their 
will). 
52. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529 n.6. 
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by the person sought to be contacted which affmnatively indicates a 
desire to engage in conversation or to receive literature. Such affirma-
tive indication may include where the person sought to be contacted 
physically approaches [a named pro-life party], or where such person 
extends his or her hand to receive literature, or speaks words indicat-
ing a positive interest in what the [named pro-life party] is saying. 
Such invited contact by a person protected hereby as it relates to a 
contact at such persons [sic] residence is limited to conduct 
transmitted by the resident to a [named pro-life party] at a distance 
from and at a time prior to the contact and shall not include the 
uninvited ringing of a doorbell or knock on the door.53 
The injunction further stated that once invited contact had 
been initiated, the person associated with the clinic could end the 
communication by stating such words as "stop," "withdraw," "back 
off," "get away," "leave me alone," or words or actions of similar 
import.54 When the desire to end the contact was made known, the 
pro-life speaker was required to immediately terminate the contact 
and leave the presence of the person protected by the injunction.55 
The "invited contact" section hinged on the emotive impact of the 
listener by using such words as "positive interest" and by providing 
that the listener affIrmatively make the invitation to speak prior to 
the attempted contact. In other words, the pro-life speaker was not 
allowed to speak unless the listener fIrst gave an invitation to do so. 
The Madsen decision relied heavily on the assumption that 
the injunction was content-neutral because those named therein had 
violated the fIrst permanent injunction.56 However, none of the peti-
tioners had been held in contempt of the previous injunction. More-
over, the amended permanent injunction made no fInding that the 
protesters had violated the fust injunction.s7 The case did not in-
volve locking arms, trespassing, or physically blocking access to the 
clinic. The only fInding by the trial court was that the size of the 
crowds was such that, on occasion, traffic had to slow its progress. 
A fInding against any of the pro-life petitioners was never brought 
before the Supreme Court. In fact, at the contempt hearing (where no 
one was found in contempt) and the hearing to modify the fIrst per-
manent injunction, the Aw~e clinic acknowledged that Judy Madsen 
53. Petitioners' Request for Certiorari at BU-12, Madsen v. Women's 
Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (No. 93-880) (emphasis added); 
Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, No. 91-2811-CA-16-K (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. Apr. 8, 1993) (amended pennanent injunction). 
54. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. 
57. [d. at 2535-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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was not a target of any contempt proceedings.58 Justice Scalia point-
ed out this fact in his dissent: 
At no time is there any apparent effort to prevent entry or exit, or 
even delay it, except for the time needed for the picketers to get out 
of the way. There was no sitting down, packing en masse, linking of 
hands or any other effort to blockade the clinic property.59 
The videotape,60 the record evidence, and the trial court's findings 
did not "contain any suggestion of violence near the clinic, nor did 
they establish any attempt to prevent entry or exit."61 Moreover, 
there was no trial court finding that the protesters had violated any 
state law.62 There was simply "no factual fmding that petitioners 
engaged in any intentional or purposeful obstruction.,,63 The Su-
preme Court's failure to critically review the evidence de novo in 
order to determine whether the protesters had in fact violated the 
previous injunction or prior state law disturbingly results in the 
Court's accepting a conclusion by the trial court that the prior in-
junction was not adequate to allow free ingress and egress.64 By re-
58. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 9, Madsen (No. 93-880). 
59. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2536 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
60. The tape contained edited footage from six to eight hours of video 
taken on three separate days by employees of Aware to focus on only "the kinds 
of activities that seem to be some of the most menacing and harassing." 
Petitioners' Reply Brief at 8 n.13, Madsen (No. 93-880) (quoting the trial testi-
mony of a witness produced by the Aware clinic who supervised the editing 
process). Justice Scalia discussed the contents of the video in his dissent. 
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535-37. 
61. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2537 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
62. Id. at 2544 n.5. 
63. Id. at 2546 (emphasis in original). 
64. Petitioners requested the Court to review the trial court's findings de 
novo. Petitioners' Brief at 10 n.4, Madsen (No. 93-880) (citing Peel v. Attorney 
Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of TIL, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990); Bose Corp. 
v. Consumer's Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 509 (1984); and Ed-
wards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)). The Court justified its 
refusal to review the evidence de novo on the mistaken assumption that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court did not have a certified record. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527-
28. The Madsen court mistakenly commented that the full record was not before 
the Florida Supreme Court, when in fact, the Florida Supreme Court had all of 
the record testimony including the videotape entered into evidence by Aware. The 
only testimony not present before the Florida Supreme Court that was present 
before the United States Supreme Court was the testimony of three individuals, 
all of which related to residential picketing, and none of which related to the 
three petitioners before the Supreme Court. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 7-9, 
Madsen (No. 93-880). 
Contrary to the Court's finding that petitioners objected to the evidence 
being admitted in appendix format, the petitioners made no such objection. In-
deed, the Florida Supreme Court indicated that it had reviewed the record evi-
dence de novo. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 670. The clinic's brief before 
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fusing to review the record testimony de novo, the Court departed 
from its prior precedent in Claiborne Hardware, where, Justice 
Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that a speech restrictive in-
junction "must be supported by findings that adequately disclose the 
evidentiary basis for concluding that specific parties agreed to use 
unlawful means, that carefully identify the impact of such unlawful 
conduct, and that recognize the importance of avoiding the imposition 
of punishment for constitutionally protected activity."6S 
In concluding that the injunction was content-neutral, the Su-
preme Court also ignored the state trial court's own admission re-
garding the purpose of the injunction. Mter the amended permanent 
injunction was entered, and nonparty individuals were arrested for 
merely penetrating the zone, the trial judge stated that the injunction 
"did not pertain to those on the other side of the issue," that it ap-
plied only to those who "seemed to be supportive of pro-life," that it 
applied only to those of a "pro-life position," and that if a person 
could convince the court she was in fact pro-choice, "perhaps the 
prosecutor wouldn't bring the formal charge.,,66 If the Court must 
consider authoritative constructions including implementation and 
interpretation,67 and if the Court must "look to the government's 
purpose as the threshold consideration,,68 in determining content-neu-
trality, the Supreme Court miserably failed. 
the United States Supreme Court also acknowledged that the Florida Supreme 
Court reviewed the record evidence. Respondents' Brief at II, Madsen (No. 93-
880). What petitioners found objectionable was duplicating all of the three days 
of trial evidence in appendix format without excerpting portions of the testimony. 
Under the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 26.1, 
petitioners and respondents are required to prepare a Joint Appendix, and are spe-
cifically instructea against duplicating evidence already in the record. The Joint 
Appendix should consist of excerpted portions of testimony rather than the testi-
mony en masse. The clinic sought to duplicate the entire three day trial testimo-
ny in the Joint Appendix, whereas petitioners argued that the testimony should be 
excerpted in relevant part so as to avoid duplication and excessive costs. The 
Joint Appendix eventually duplicated the entire three day trial testimony. The cost 
of printing alone amounted to more than $23,000. Petition for Rehearing of Peti-
tioners at 2-4, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) 
(No. 93-880) . 
. 65. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 933-34. 
66. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2550-52 (appendix to opinion of Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis supplied). 
67. Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. at 2402 (citations omitted); see also 
Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 750. 
68. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. 
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B. Prior Restraint 
Not only did the Supreme Court find that the injunction was 
content-neutral, it also found the injunction was not a prior re-
straint.69 To reach this conclusion, the Madsen majority focused on-
lyon the thirty-six foot buffer zone.70 The Court concluded that the 
protesters were free to express themselves in a number of ways ex-
cept within the thirty-six foot zone.71 In rejecting a prior restraint 
argument, the Court never bothered to consider the images proscrip-
tion, the no-approach zone, or the invited contact provision. If the 
invited contact provision is not a prior restraint whereby it prohibits 
communication "prior to" its occurrence and allows communication 
only after the listener invites the speaker, then a prior restraint find-
ing will be rare indeed. 
Though the Madsen Court stated that prior restraints "do 
often take the form of injunctions,'>72 in the prior term, the Court 
found that "temporary restraining orders and permanent injunc-
tions-Le., court orders that actually forbid speech activities-are 
classic examples of prior restraints.'>73 Indeed, the term "prior re-
straint" is used "to describe administrative and judicial orders for-
bidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time 
that such communications are to occur."74 However, in Madsen, the 
Court stated that not all injunctions which may "incidentally affect 
expression" are prior restraints in the sense that the Court used the 
term in New York Times Co. v. United States75 or Vance v. Univer-
sal Amusement CO.76 The Florida Supreme Court found that the in-
junction was not a prior restraint because it was not a content-based 
restriction.77 The Madsen Court also stated that the injunction was 
69. Id. at 2524 n.2. 
70. The Court avoided addressing this question as it related to the "images 
observable" and the "no-approach" sections. [d. at 2529 n.6. These sections were 
stricken using the Madsen test without reaching a content-based or prior restraint 
test. 
71. Id. at 2524 n.2. 
72. Id. 
73. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2771 (1993). 
74. Id. 
75. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing to enjoin publication of ''The Pentagon 
Papers"). 
76. 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that the Texas Public Nui-
sance Statute which authorized state judges, on the basis of a showing that a 
theater had exhibited obscene films in the past, to enjoin its future exhibition of 
films not yet found to be obscene was unconstitutional as authorizing an invalid 
prior restraint). 
77. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 674. 
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not issued because of the content of the" protesters' expression as was 
the case in the New York Times Co. and Vance, "but because of 
their prior unlawful conduct.,,78 
In finding that the injunction was not a prior restraint, the 
Court departed from its past precedent. Had the Court found that the 
injunction was a prior restraint, then a level of scrutiny equal to, or 
higher than, a content-based restriction would have been applicable. 
A prior restraint bears a "heavy presumption" against its constitution-
al validity.79 The state must meet a "heavy burden" to impose a 
prior restraint on speech.so The presumption against prior restraints 
is heavier, and the degree of protection broader, than that against 
limits on expression imposed by criminal statutes. Society "prefers to 
punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break: the law 
than to throttle them and all others beforehand. "SI The Supreme 
Court has previously noted that in "determining the extent of the 
constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, 
considered that it is the chief purpose of the [First Amendment] 
guarantee to prevent previous restraints upon publication."82 Indeed, 
the Court has stated that "the prevention of [prior restraint] was the 
leading purpose in the adoption of [the First Amendment].,,83 
A prior restraint fmding is not dependent on a content-based 
fmding. The injunction in Carroll was content-neutral but was ana-
lyzed as a prior restraint. 84 The Supreme Court has traditionally 
condemned licensing schemes as prior restraints without regard to 
content restrictions.8S As Justice Scalia noted: 
Although a speech-restricting injunction may not attack content as 
content • • • it lends itself just as readily to the targeted suppression 
of particular ideas. When a judge, on the motion of an employer, 
enjoins picketing at the site of a labor dispute. he enjoins (and he 
78. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2. Presumably the Court would have 
entertained the prior restraint argument if the protesters had not allegedly violated 
a prior nonspeech restrictive injunction. In other words, if the challenged in-
junction was entered in the absence of alleged past illegal conduct, it would have 
been analyzed as a prior restraint. 
79. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70. 
80. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 539; see also New York Times Co., 
403 U.S. at 713; Vance, 445 U.S. at 315-16; Near, 283 U.S. at 713. 
81. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546. 559 (1975). 
82. Near, 283 U.S. at 713. 
83. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938); see also 
Carroll, 393 U.S. at 181 ("prior restraint upon speech suppresses the precise free-
dom which the First Amendment sought to protect against abridgement"). 
84. Carroll, 393 U.S. at 181. 
85. Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. at 2395 (parade permits); Shuttlesworth v. 
City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (public demonstration permits); Lovell. 
303 U.S. at 444 Oiterature distribution permit). 
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knows he is enjoining) the expression of pro-union views. Such target-
ing of one or the other side of an ideological dispute cannot readily 
be achieved in speech-restricting general legislation except by making 
content the basis of the restriction; it is achieved in speech-restricting 
injunctions almost invariably.86 
Justice Scalia rightly pointed out: 
[T]he Court errs in thinking that the vice of content-based statutes is 
that they necessarily have the invidious purpose of suppressing partic-
ular ideas. "Our cases have consistently held that '[i]11icit legislative 
intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amend-
ment.'" ... The vice of content-based legislation-what renders it de-
serving of the high standard of strict scrutiny-is not that it is always 
used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to 
use for those purposes. And, because of the unavoidable 
'targeting' . . . precisely the same is true of the speech-restricting 
injunction.87 
479 
In other words, the vice of a prior restraint, whether in a 
licensing scheme or an injunction, is not that the restriction is con-
tent-based, but that it lends itself to those purposes.88 Whether the 
decision maker is a judge, or an individual with whom discretionary 
licensing power is vested, makes no difference-both are prior re-
straints regardless of whether the restriction is facially content-based. 
The fact that the decision maker is able to make content-based re-
strictions is enough for a prior restraint. Moreover, in the Madsen 
injunction, the fact that listeners were empowered by the trial judge 
to make content-based restrictions, choosing whether to communicate 
if they showed a "positive interest" in the subject matter, or invited 
the contact prior to its communication, is proof that at least part of 
the injunction lent itself to a prior restraint because it afforded the 
opportunity for a content-based restriction. 
If the Court had found the Madsen injunction to be a prior 
restraint, the level of scrutiny would have equaled, or exceeded, that 
86. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2538 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
87. [d. at 2539 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Simon & Schuester v. New 
York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991» (other citations omitted). 
88. A prior restraint "lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by 
local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displea-
sure, [and] results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of dis-
cussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview." Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). Such a deterrent need not affect total sup-
pression in order to create a prior restraint. Conrad, 420 U.s. at 556 n.8. Vest-
ing the right to suppress speech to the discretion of the decision maker results in 
a prior restraint. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 88. "It is not merely the sporadic 
abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very exis-
tence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion." ld. at 97. 
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applicable to content-based restrictions. As content-based restrictions 
come to the Court with a heavy presumption against their constitu-
tionality,89 so prior restraints are presumptively invalid.90 
C. The New Madsen Test 
The "newly enunciated test,,91 in Madsen applies only to 
injunctions which are neither content-based restrictions nor prior re-
straints. The Madsen test is not applicable to statutes or ordinances. 
In the case of a content-based injunction, a content-based test should 
be utilized.92 If the injunction is a prior restraint, then the Madsen 
test is inapplicable and the prior restraint analysis should be uti-
lized.93 
For the fust time in its history, the Supreme Court in 
Madsen delineated differences between injunctions and generally 
applicable statutes or ordinances.94 The Court found that the injunc-
tion was content-neutral and thus not deserving of the highest level 
of scrutiny. However, the Court found that the content-neutral stan-
89. See, e.g., Vance, 445 U.S. at 315-16; Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. 
at 560; New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714; Organization for a Better Austin, 
402 U.S. at 419; Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70; see also Vincent Blasi, Toward 
a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REv. 11 (1981). 
90. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992). 
91. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 34 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1994). 
92. A content-based regulation is subject to strict scrutiny. Burson v. Free-
man, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1993); see also R.A. v., 112 S. Ct. at 2542; Boos, 485 
U.S. at 321 ("the most exacting scrutiny"); Heffron v. International Soc'y for 
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (strict scrutiny). The regulation 
must be supported by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest. The narrow tailoring is often referred to as the 
least restrictive means. Boos, 485 U.S. at 329; see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 
U.S. 474, 482 (1988); Ward, 491 U.S. at 799; City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 
451, 464-67 (1987); Wygant v. Jacksonville Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 
(1986) (plurality opinion). "Content-based restrictions also have been held to raise 
Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection concerns because, in the course of regu-
lating speech, such restrictions differentiate between types of speech." Burson, 112 
S. Ct. at 1850 n.3. Like content-based regulations, equal protection violations also 
face strict scrutiny. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 
440 (1985);· see also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); 
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1951). 
93. A prior restraint faces a heavy presumption against constitutional validi-
ty, and like content-based restrictions, must be narrowly tailored. See, e.g., Alex-
ander, 113 S. Ct. at 2766; Vance, 445 U.S. at 308; Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 
at 43; Organization for a Better Austin, 402 U.S. at 415; New York Times Co., 
376 U.S. at 254; Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 58; Near, 283 U.S. at 697; see 
also Blasi, supra note 89. Prior restraints are considered "the most serious and 
the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." Nebraska Press 
Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559. 
94. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524-26. 
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dard was not sufficiently vigorous when applied to injunctions.9s 
Prior to the Madsen case, the three levels of scrutiny had previously 
been enunciated as follows: (1) strict scrutiny for content-based regu-
lations regardless of the forum; (2) intermediate scrutiny for content-
neutral regulations in a public forum; and (3) a rational basis test for 
content-neutral regulations in a nonpublic forum.96 The Court was 
not willing to utilize the intermediate level of scrutiny for content-
neutral regulations because of the obvious differences between ordi-
nances and injunctions.97 The Court noted: 
Ordinances represent a legislative choice regarding the promotion of 
particular societal interests. Injunctions, by contrast, are remedies 
imposed for violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative or 
judicial decree . . . [i]njunctions also carry greater risks of censorship 
and discriminatory application than do general ordinances.98 
The Court found that the differences between content-neutral 
regulations and content-neutral injunctions required "a somewhat 
more stringent application of general First Amendment principles."99 
The Court then noted that its past precedents relied both on general 
First Amendment principles while also seeking to ensure that injunc-
tions were no broader than necessary to achieve the desired 
goals.1OO The Court observed: 
[C]lose attention to the fit between the objectives of an injunction and 
the restrictions it imposes on speech is consistent with the general 
rule, quite apart from First Amendment considerations, "that injunctive 
relief should be no more burdensome to the defendants than necessary 
95. Id. at 2524-25. Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are per-
missible in content-neutral regulations. Such restrictions must be narrowly tailored 
to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative means 
of communication. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. 
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
96. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 37. 
97. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. Though Justice Scalia brought up the col-
lateral bar rule in his dissent as one obvious difference between injunctions and 
ordinances, the Madsen majority did not address this issue. The collateral bar rule 
in and of itself should require a higher level of scrutiny for injunctions as op-
posed to ordinances. For example, a protester contesting the constitutionality of a 
speech restrictive ordinance may ignore it and later challenge its constitutionality. 
Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150. However, a protester faced with a speech restric-
tive injunction must obey the injunction even if it is later found to be unconsti-
tutional. A subsequent finding of unconstitutionality does not invalidate the penal-
ty for violating the injunction. Cf. Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 147; Walker v. City 
of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
98. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 (citation omitted). 
99. Id. 
100. For this proposition, Madsen cited Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 
886; Carroll, 393 U.S. at 175; Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 
Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). 
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to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs."lol 
The Court then concluded: 
Accordingly, when evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we think 
that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently 
rigorous. We must ask instead whether the challenged provisions of 
the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a sig-
nificant government interest. 102 
Ironically, although the Court opined that its new test is more 
stringent than that applicable to content-neutral regulations, the test 
itself-whether the injunction burdens no more speech than necessary 
to serve a significant government interest-originated in content-neu-
tral regulations, and as such, was reiterated by the Supreme Court 
only three days before the Madsen decision. 103 During the same 
week Madsen was decided, the Supreme Court in Turner 
Broadcasting System stated that a content-neutral regulation may not 
"burden more speech than necessary."I04 
In adopting this new standard for content-neutral injunctions, 
the Supreme Court argued that this standard was similar to the "pre-
cision of regulation" demanded in Claiborne Hardware!05 and the 
Carroll standard which requires an injunction be "couched in the 
narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective."I06 
The Court stated the requirement that the injunction "burden no more 
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest" was 
equivalent to the standard utilized in Claiborne Hardware and 
Carroll.l07 In Claiborne Hardware the Court used the phrase "pre-
101. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 
682, 702 (1979». 
102. [d. at 2525. 
103. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994); 
see also United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2704 (1993); 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510-11 (1993); 
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2722 
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Gentle v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 
2746 (1991) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 
757 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 
476-78 (1989); Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99; Frisby, 487 U.S. at 491, 496 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984). 
104. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2469. 
105. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106. Carroll, 393 U.S. at 183. 
107. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526. If the level of scrutiny under the Madsen 
test was equivalent to the scrutiny used in Claiborne Hardware and Carroll, then 
the scrutiny required by Madsen was indeed vigorous. The challenged injunctions 
in Claiborne Hardware and Carroll were found to be unconstitutional. 
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cision of regulation" in the context of a stringent. review of the re-
cord to ensure that any restrictions on speech mixed with conduct 
did not violate the First Amendment.IOS The injunction at issue in 
Carroll was a prior restraint.109 
The facts in Claiborne Hardware were more egregious than 
the facts in Madsen. l1o In March 1966, several hundred African-
Americans implemented a boycott of white merchants following ra-
cial abuses in Claiborne County, Mississippi. This boycott, which 
lasted approximately seven years, included "acts of physical force 
and violence" including "[i]ntimidation, threats, social ostracism, 
vilification, and . . . the stationing of guards . . . in the vicinity of 
white-owned businesses.,,\11 The Court described the "atmosphere of 
fear" which prevailed and further found that in two cases shots were 
fired at a house, and a brick was thrown through a windshield. ll2 
Other incidents include shots, a fight, slashing of tires, and threaten-
ing telephone callS.113 Store watchers were posted outside the white-
owned business who recorded the names of the boycott violators and 
later published them in The Black Times in order to coerce others to 
comply with the boycott demands.1l4 During this time period, a lo-
cal civil rights leader was shot and killed, and Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. was assassinated on April 4, 1968. The "[t]ension in the 
community neared a breaking point."\15 Coinciding with the esca-
lation in violence was the continuous, uniformly peaceful, and order-
ly picketing of the white-owned businesses, that primarily took place 
on weekends.116 
The Mississippi Supreme Court permanently enjoined the 
boycott, but the United States Supreme Court reversed and found that 
each element of the boycott was a protected form of speech.ll7 The 
Court declared that the right to associate did not lose all constitu-
108. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916. 
109. Cj. Carroll, 393 U.S. at 181; Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2. 
110. One difference between the two cases is that Madsen involved a prior 
nonspeech restrictive injunction which the Court (erroneously) assumed had been 
violated. The protesters who boycotted in Claiborne Hardware had not violated a 
prior nonspeech restrictive injunction before the entry of the speech restrictive 
injunction. According to Madsen, the violation of a nonspeech restrictive injunc-
tion is an important element in upholding portions of a subsequent speech restric-
tive injunction. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527; see also National Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 698 (1978). 
111. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 894. 
112. [d. at 904. 
113. [d. 
114. [d. at 903-04. 
115. [d. at 901-02. 
116. [d. at 903. 
117. [d. at 911-12. 
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tional protection "merely because some members of the group may 
have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that is itself pro-
tected.,,1l8 Finding that "precision of regulation" was demanded, the 
Court carefully examined the record for factual support, and conclud-
ed that the injunction "must be dissolved" or "modified to restrain 
only unlawful conduct and the persons responsible for conduct of 
that character.,,1l9 
Though the majority opinion in Madsen argues that its newly 
enunciated test is no different than the test found in Carroll, the 
Carroll standard appears to be more analogous to strict scrutiny. The 
injunction in Carroll was a prior restraint. With regard to an injunc-
tion, the Court cautioned: 
[I]n the area of First Amendment rights [an injunction] must be 
couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed 
objectives permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs 
of the public order. In this sensitive field, the State may not employ 
"means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end 
can be more narrowly achieved" . . . . In other words, the order must 
be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs oj the case. \20 
Carroll's use of language including "narrowest terms," "pin-
pointed objective," and "tailored as precisely as possible to the exact 
needs of the case," sounds closely analogous to the content-based 
requirement of strict scrutiny and least restrictive means.121 Despite 
the Court's twisted logic, we must take Madsen at its word that the 
118. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 908. 
119. /d. at 924 n.67. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in 
Claiborne Hardware, but in Madsen, he was the only justice who argued that 
injunctions should be analyzed with less scrutiny then content-neutral regulations. 
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2531-34 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see also Hirsch v. City of Atlanta, 495 U.S. 927 (1990) (Justice Stevens, 
in a denial of certiorari regarding an anti-abortion picketing injunction, stated that 
it was content-neutral based upon the past activities of the protesters, and there-
fore should not be compared with other injunctive cases such as ViI/age oj 
Skokie, 432 U.S. at 43). 
120. Carroll, 393 U.S. at 183-84 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 
488 (1960» (emphasis added). 
121. The strained reasoning by the Madsen majority is what led Justice 
Scalia to castigate the Court by stating that, were it not for the context being 
abortion, a different result would have ensued. Justice Scalia pointed to an opin-
ion written by Justice O'Connor and joined by then-Justice Rehnquist: 
"This Court's abortion decisions have already worked a major distortion in 
the Court's constitutional jurisprudence. Today's decision goes further, and 
makes it painfully clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc 
nullification by this Court when an occasion for its application arises in a 
case involving state regulation of abortion. . . . " 
Madsen. 114 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists. 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1989». 
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newly enunciated standard for content-neutral injunctions-whether 
the injunction burdens no more speech than necessary to serve a 
significant government interest-is more stringent than content-neutral 
regulations. 
Taken in context based on the facts of Madsen, the new test 
is clearly more stringent than the test applicable to content-neutral 
regulations. Madsen began its inquiry into the new test by stating 
that under general equity principles, an injunction may issue only if 
"[1] there is a showing that the defendant has violated, or imminent-
ly will violate, some provision of statutory or common law, and [2] 
that there is a 'cognizable danger of recurrent violation.",122 Once 
these two prerequisites have been met, then' a nonspeech restrictive 
injunction may be implemented. In Madsen, the first injunction re-
stricted only conduct, not speech. That injunction prohibited trespass-
ing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress into or 
egress from the abortion clinic. The injunction further prohibited 
physically abusing persons entering, leaving, or using any services of 
any abortion facility. Moreover, that injunction applied only to named 
defendants, not those acting in concert with them. Only identifiable, 
illegal conduct was prohibited by the first injunction. Consequently, 
once the first two prerequisites are met, an injunction may be entered 
prohibiting the illegal conduct that gave rise to the issuance. 
The next step in the Madsen analysis questions whether the 
nonspeech restrictive injunction effectively achieved the significant 
government interests. The interest identified in Madsen was maintain-
ing physical access to the clinic. Because the Court concluded that 
the first injunction was inadequate to protect access, and (wrongly) 
concluded that the named defendants repeatedly violated the first 
injunction, the Court was willing to uphold certain speech restrictive 
portions of the second injunction. Consequently, the second injunc-
tion, known in the Madsen case as the amended permanent injunc-
tion, was literally four steps removed from illegal activity.123 
In summary, the Madsen opinion sets up a four part test 
before a speech restrictive injunction may be upheld: (1) there must 
be a showing that the defendant has violated, or eminently will vio-
late, some provision of statutory or common law; (2) there is a cog-
nizable danger of recurrent violation; (3) an injunction designed to 
122. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. 2525 n.3 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 
345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953». 
123. The majority opinion cited National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 
U.S. at 679, for the proposition that an injunction may restrict what would nor-
mally be protected expressive activities when, in the context of that restriction, 
the violator is known to have repeatedly engaged in illegal conduct. Madsen, 114 
S. Ct. at 2527. 
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restrict illegal conduct rather than speech is found to be inadequate 
to serve the significant government interests because it too has been 
repeatedly violated; and (4) the subsequent speech restrictive injunc-
tion may not burden more speech than necessary to serve a signifi-
cant government interest.l24 
1. The Thirty-Six Foot Zone 
The thirty-six foot buffer zone in Madsen extended outward 
from three sides of the clinic property and prohibited the named 
defendants, and those acting in concert with them, from entering the 
zone. Directly in front of the clinic was a public highway known as 
Dixie Way, and parallel to that road was a small sidewalk that con-
nected the clinic driveway to another clinic entrance. No other side-
walks were in the community. The clinic operated as a business out 
of a home located in a residential area. Directly in front of the clinic 
was Dixie Way, by which access to the clinic was achieved. On the 
side of the clinic intersecting with Dixie Way was the highway 
known as U.S. Highway 1. In the back and on the other side of the 
clinic were private residential homes. The thirty-six foot zone extend-
ed onto this private property, but the record title holders were ex-
empted unless they, or their invitees, were found to be acting in 
concert with the named defendants. If they were in concert, then they 
were prohibited on their own private property from congregating, 
picketing, and even entering the zone. l2S The Madsen opinion con-
124. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Pro-Choice Network, though 
not articulating Madsen as a four-part test. analyzed the buffer zone restriction 
using this format and found a fifteen (15) foot buffer zone to be unconstitutional 
under the heightened scrutiny demanded by Madsen. Pro-Choice Network, 34 F.3d 
at 140-41. 
125. Below is a diagram of the clinic and surrounding geography which was 
part of the record before the United States Supreme Court: 
PARKING 
LOT 
-,-
~ ____ ~_~-1~~~~==~~l-____ -\ 
~ 
HeinOnline -- 14 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 487 1994-1995
1995] INJUNCI'IVE REUEF AND THE MADSEN TEST 487 
eluded that the "state court seems to have had few other options to 
protect access given the narrow confines around the cliniC."l26 The 
Court assumed that the first injunction failed to protect access to the 
clinic and consequently more radical measures were necessary. 
Though the Court noted that "a complete buffer zone near the clinic 
entrances and driveway may be debatable,,,l27 it gave deference to 
the state court's familiarity with the factual background and con-
eluded: 
We also bear in mind the fact that the state court originally issued a 
much narrower injunction, providing no buffer zone, and that this 
order did not succeed in protecting access to the clinic. The failure of 
the fIrst order to accomplish its purpose may be taken into consider-
ation in evaluating the constitutionality of the broader order.l28 
The Court upheld the thirty-six foot buffer zone around the 
clinic entrance and driveway but struck down two sides of the thirty-
six foot zone that extended onto private residential property. Interest-
ingly, although the Court ignored certain evidence when striking 
down two sides of the thirty-six foot zone on private property, the 
Court recognized that no evidence was presented that the protesters 
located on the private property blocked vehicular traffic. 129 The 
Court then stated: 
Absent evidence that petitioners standing on the private property have 
obstructed access to the clinic, blocked vehicular traffic, or otherwise 
unlawfully interfered with the clinic's operation, this portion of the 
buffer zone fails to serve the signifIcant government interest relied on 
by the Florida Supreme Court.1JO 
Petitioner's Request for Certiorari at B14, Madsen (No. 93-880). 
126. Madsen, 114 s. Ct. at 2527. In upholding the portion of the 36 foot 
zone at the clinic entrance and driveway, the Court focused on two factors: (1) 
an assumption that the protesters had violated a prior nonspeech restrictive in-
junction which was ineffective in maintaining free ingress and egress; and (2) the 
narrow confines of the clinic which included a narrow strip of sidewalk approxi-
mately four feet wide and 37 feet long which connected the two parking lots. 
The road directly in front of the clinic was known as Dixie Way which was 
only 21 feet, four inches wide. Other than the narrow strip of sidewalk directly 
in front of the clinic, no other sidewalks existed in the residential area along 
Dixie Way or u.s. Highway 1. Clearly, if the first factor was absent, the Court 
would not have upheld the 36 foot zone at the clinic entrance and driveway. 
Additionally, if the second factor was absent, the Court may not have upheld this 
portion of the zone. In other words, if the confines of the clinic were not so 
narrow, leaving little other alternative but the imposition of the 36 foot zone, the 
Court more than likely would have struck this portion of the injunction as it 
struck the majority of the injunction. 
127. ld. at 2527. 
128. ld. (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 697-98). 
129. ld. at 2528. 
130. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528. 
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2. The Noise Restriction 
The injunction prohibited the named picketers from '''singing, 
chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, 
sound amplification equipment, or other sounds or images observable 
to or within earshot of the patients inside the clinic' during the hours 
of 7:30 a.m. through noon on Mondays through Saturdays.',l3J In 
upholding this portion of the injunction, the Court took into account 
the place to which the regulation applied, noting that noise control 
was particularly important around hospitals and medical facilities. 132 
The Court found that the noise ordinance did not burden more 
speech than necessary and that the First Amendment did "not de-
mand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts 
to escape the cacophony of political protest.,,133 
3. The Images Observable Restriction 
The amended permanent injunction further prohibited the 
protesters from displaying any image which could be observed by 
someone within the clinic. The Court found that this blanket prohibi-
tion on all images observable burdened more speech than neces-
sary.l34 The Court further noted that "if the blanket ban on 'images 
observable' was intended to reduce the level of anxiety and hyperten-
sion suffered by the patients inside the clinic, it would still fail.,,13S 
The Court concluded that the only plausible reason a patient would 
be bothered by images observable would be "if the patient found the 
131. Id. 
132. Id. At this point in the opinion, the Court made another factual error. 
Specifically, the Court quoted NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 783-
84 n.12 (1979), which in turn quoted Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 
509 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment), and referred to these deci-
sions as "another injunction involving a medical facility." Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 
2528. Neither Baptist Hospital nor Beth Israel Hospital involved injunctions as 
Justice Scalia rightfully pointed out in his dissent. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2547 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, both cases dealt "not with whether the government 
had violated the First Amendment by restricting noise, but with whether the 
hospital had violated the National Labor Relations Act by restricting solicitation 
(including solicitation of union membership)" inside the hospital. Id. The Court's 
careless findings of fact and inaccuracies in identifying its own past precedents 
might be explained on the basis that they placed Madsen on an expedited tract, 
accepting certiorari on January 21, 1994, and rendering an opinion on June 30, 
1994. 
133. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528. 
134. Id. at 2529. 
135. Id. 
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expression contained in such images disagreeable.,,136 The Court 
concluded that it would be much easier "for the clinic to pull its cur-
tains than for a patient to stop up her ears, and no more is required 
to avoid seeing placards through the windows of the clinic."131 The 
Court consequently struck down the images restriction. 
4. The No-Approach Consent Zone 
The Court also struck down the 300 foot zone around the 
clinic which can be described as the no-approach zone or the consent 
zone.138 When entering this zone, the named defendant was prohib-
ited from approaching a person associated with the clinic either as an 
employee, patient, volunteer, owner, or "agent" unless such person 
indicated a desire to communicate.139 Consequently, within this 300 
foot radius around the clinic, the pro-life speaker could only speak 
with the consent and invitation of the listener. The Court noted: 
[l]t is difficult, indeed, to justify a prohibition on all uninvited ap-
proaches of persons seeking the services of the clinic, regardless of 
how peaceful the contact may be, without burdening more speech than 
necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic. 
Absent evidence that the protestors' speech is independently 
prescribable (i.e., "fighting words" or threats), or is so infused with 
violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm . . . 
this provision cannot stand. "As a general matter, we have indicated 
that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and 
even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space 
to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment."I40 
The Court concluded that the "consent" requirement alone burdened 
more speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure 
access to the clinic. 141 
136. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529. If that is the case, then why are the im-
ages observable not a content-based restriction? The Court refused to address this 
question. Id. at 2529 n.6. 
137. Id. at 2529. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 322 
(1988» (emphasis added) (other internal citations and quotations omitted). 
141. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529. Here the Court inserted its footnote indi-
cating that it need not determine whether the "images observable" and the "no-
approach" provisions were content-based. Id. at 2529 n.6. Based on their own 
internal discussions, both provisions were obviously content-based. The majority's 
discussion at this point of the opinion contradicts the earlier part of the opinion 
where the Court concluded that the injunction was content-neutral. 
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5. The Residential Zone 
The final substantive regulation analyzed by the Court was a 
300 foot buffer zone placed around the residential homes of the clin-
ic employees, staff, owners, or agents. This section of the amended 
permanent injunction differed from the 300 foot zone around the 
clinic. The residential zone prohibited approaching, congregating, 
picketing, patrolling, demonstrating, or using bullhorns or other sound 
amplification equipment within 300 feet of the residential homes, or 
blocking or attempting to block, barricade, or in any other manner, 
temporarily or otherwise, obstructing the entrances, exits, or drive-
wayS' of the residences.142 
In the context of an ordinance, the Supreme Court had previ-
ously upheld a restriction against targeted picketing of residential 
homes, noting that the home was the "last citadel of the tired, the 
weary, and the sick.,,143 However, the Court noted that the 300 foot 
zone in Madsen was much larger than the ordinance upheld in 
Frisby.l44 The prohibition in Frisby was limited to "focused pick-
eting taking place solely in front of a particular residence.,,14s "By 
contrast, the 300-foot zone would ban '[g]eneral marching through 
residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an 
entire block of houses .... 146 The Court therefore found that the resi-
dential zone did not contain sufficient justification for such a broad 
ban on picketing, but noted that "a limitation on the time, duration 
of picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone could 
have accomplished the desired result.,,147 
6. The "In Concert" Provision 
The Madsen Court declined to consider the "in concert" 
provision, stating that the named picketers lacked standing to chal-
lenge that portion of the order because it applied to persons not 
parties before the Court.148 It was precisely the "in concert" provi-
sion that was challenged by Cheffer149 in the Eleventh Circuit Court 
142. Id. at 2522. 
143. Id. at 2529. 
144. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988). 
145. Id. at 483. 
146, Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 2530 (citing Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 
(1945». 
149. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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of Appeals which gave rise to the conflict leading to the grant of 
certiorari.150 Cheffer was a nonparty who challenged the "in con-
cert" provision and therefore had standing, but the petitioners before 
the Supreme Court were named defendants and consequently could 
not challenge the "in concert" provision because it did not apply to 
them and was not subject to an overbreadth challenge. In the proper 
context, it is quite possible an injunction may be content-neutral as it 
relates to the named parties based upon their past illegal conduct, but 
content-based as applied to nonparties through an "in concert" provi-
sion. A broad application of an "in concert" provision applied to 
someone with no past illegal conduct may well be considered con-
tent-based, and subject to content-based scrutiny rather than to the 
Madsen test.151 
IV. CONCLUSION 
On the road to developing a new test for content-neutral 
injunctions, the Madsen majority accepted as fact certain evidence 
not supported by the record and twisted past precedent. First, the 
Madsen opinion based its ruling on the assumption that the picketers 
had repeatedly violated statutory or common law and a prior 
nonspeech restrictive injunction. Second, the Court assumed that the 
first injunction was inadequate to protect access to the clinic. 152 
150. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522-23. 
151. A cursory reading of Madsen and Cheffer seems to suggest a conflict 
between the two opinions. Madsen found that the injunction was content-neutral 
whereas Cheffer found the same injunction content-based. Cf. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. 
at 2523-24 with Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 710-11. Upon closer analysis, the two opin-
ions are consistent. The two cases are clearly distinguishable in that Madsen ad-
dressed the injunction in light of the named defendants, but Cheffer addressed the 
injunction in light of nonparties. In Madsen, the Court focused on the fact that 
the named defendants (1) violated some statutory or common law, (2) engaged in 
recurrent violations of statutory or common law, and (3) repeatedly violated a 
nonspeech restrictive injunction issued to enforce the repeated violations of statu-
tory or common law. In light of this assumption, the Court found that the speech 
restrictive portions of the injunction were content-neutral because the injunction 
served only to restrict illegal conduct rather than speech. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 
2523-24 n.3. In Cheffer, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
application of the injunction to non parties was content-based. Madsen did not 
address the "in concert" provision, Madsen 114 S. Ct. at 2530, whereas Cheffer 
only addressed the "in concert" provision. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 708-11. The Cheffer 
court found that the "in concert" provision had been applied so broadly by the 
judge to nonparties based solely on their beliefs, rather than their conduct, and 
therefore operated more like a criminal statute. ld. Applying this broad applica-
tion to Cheffer, who had neither violated any statutory or common law nor any 
nonspeech restrictive injunction, resulted in a content-based restriction to her 
speech. ld. at 707-08, 711. 
152. As noted previously, the record evidence does not support these find-
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Third, the Court found that the injunction was content-neutral. lS3 
Fourth, the Court concluded that the injunction was not a prior re-
straint. 154 The Court concluded that its new test was similar to the 
"precision of regulation" used in Claiborne Hardware, and the pre-
cise tailoring used to meet the pin-pointed objective test noted in 
Carroll. ISS 
Despite the factual and legal hurdles, the Court developed a 
new test for content-neutral injunctions by taking language from past 
decisions involving content-neutral regulations. The Court concluded 
however, that the new test was more stringent than the test applica-
ble to content-neutral regulations. An accurate application of this test 
demands a correct predicate before the test can be applied. 
The analysis in applying the Madsen test is as follows: (1) if 
the injunction is content-based, then the Madsen test is inapplicable 
because a content-based analysis must be followed; or (2) if the 
injunction is a prior restraint, then the Madsen test is inapplicable 
since a prior restraint analysis must be followed. If the injunction is 
neither a content-based restriction nor a prior restraint, then Madsen 
applies, and the following analysis should be utilized in determining 
the constitutionality of the injunctive relief: (1) there must be a 
showing that the defendant has violated, or imminently will violate, 
some provision of statutory or common law; (2) there is a cognizable 
danger of recurrent violation; (3) a nonspeech restrictive injunction 
preventing the repeated illegal conduct has proven ineffective to 
protect the significant government interests because the defendant has 
repeatedly violated the injunction; and (4) a subsequent speech re-
strictive injunction may not burden more speech than necessary to 
serve a significant government interest. 156 
ings. 
153. The Court's finding of content-neutrality was based in large part upon 
the assumption that the picketers had repeatedly violated statutory or common law 
and continued to violate a nonspeech restrictive injunction. However, the Court 
did not totally dispense with the possibility that portions of the injunction were 
content-based, namely the "images observable" and the "no-approach" sections. 
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529 n.6. 
154. Ironically, in the prior term, the Court indicated that permanent in-
junctions were classic examples of prior restraints. Alexander v. United States, 
113 S. Ct. 2766, 2771 (1993). 
155. However, in Claiborne Hardware, the Court painstakingly scrutinized the 
record and concluded that speech when mixed with conduct could not be 
abridged by merely lumping protected expressive activities with illegal conduct. 
Moreover, in Carroll, the Court found the injunction to be a prior restraint, 
which leads one to question how can the Madsen test be identical to the Carroll 
test since prior restraints are met with a higher level of scrutiny than the Madsen 
test provides. 
156. The Madsen Court relied heavily on the assumption that the petitioners 
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The impact of Madsen will require a majority of the injunc-
tions involving buffer zonesl57 to be reconsidered under the new 
heightened scrutiny. Many of these types of injunctions which have 
been upheld relied on a content-neutral regulation analysis.15s Most 
injunctions involving abortion clinic buffer zones which have been 
upheld by state or federal courts will not survive the new Madsen 
test. Though it seems axiomatic that injunctions are equitable reme-
dies, many courts prior to Madsen have ignored the two fundamental 
prerequisites which must be present for the entry of any injunction, 
namely: (1) there is a showing that the defendant has violated, or 
imminently will violate, some form of statutory or common law, and 
(2) there is a cognizable danger of recurrent violation. 159 
Indeed, many of these injunctions will not even survive the 
two prerequisites necessary before getting to a nonspeech restrictive 
injunction. If the Madsen decision is used out of context for the 
proposition that an injunction is not ipso facto content-based or a pri-
or restraint, or if a quick handed approach is used to uphold buffer 
zones without using the four step process, then the Madsen case will, 
in fact, weaken the First Amendment. However, if the facts of 
repeatedly violated a nonspeech restrictive injunction, and it is based on this 
reliance that the Court later upheld portions of the 36 foot buffer zone involving 
the speech restrictive portion of the second injunction. The Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals recognized this analysis in striking down a 15 foot buffer zone and 
in overruling one of its prior decisions under the new Madsen test. Pro-Choice 
Network, 34 F.3d at 140-42. 
157. The Madsen analysis is applicable to any content-neutral injunction. It 
does not apply to only abortion clinic buffer zones, but extends to labor disputes 
and any other speech restrictive injunction. 
158. See, e.g., Murray v. Lawson, 642 A.2d 338 (N.J.), cert. granted, vacat-
ed and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 44 (1994). Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. 
v. Williams, 873 P.2d 1224 (Cal. 1994); Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of 
Greensboro, 431 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Fargo Women's Health Org., 
Inc. v. Lambs of Christ, 488 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1992); Northeast Women's Ctr., 
Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of 
San Mateo County v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 
1991); Hirsch v. City of Atlanta, 401 S.E.2d 530 (Ga.), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 
2836, 112 S. Ct. 75 (1991)); Valenzuela v. Aquino, 800 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1990); Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1986), cert. dismissed, 479 
U.S. 1050 (1987). 
159. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525 n.3. On this basis alone, Madsen will result 
in the reexamination of many injunctions. Even in cases where these two prereq-
uisites have been met, Madsen will require the reexamination of speech restrictive 
injunctions that have been entered in the absence of finding repeated violations of 
prior nonspeech restrictive injunctions. Finally, in those cases where these three 
prerequisites have been met, Madsen will require the reexamination of injunctions 
using the new heightened scrutiny analysis because some courts have used a 
lesser content-neutral test applicable to ordinances. Taken in context, Madsen will 
allow a speech restrictive injunction only after a showing of persistent illegal 
conduct. 
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Madsen and the Court's assumptions, whether right or wrong, are 
utilized in the four step process which the Court itself undertook, 
then, on balance, the Madsen test is a laudable decision in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
